Economists Uncut

CapitalCosm (Uncut) 01-20-2025

Stock of money, measured by M2 in the economy, is less today than it was in the summer of 2022. So what’s that imply? Well, that’s only happened four times since the Federal Reserve was founded in 1913. And all four of those times, we had, of course, a recession.

 

Things slowed down. The money supply contracts, and then with a lag, usually a lag of around 12 to 24 months, you get a slowdown in the economy, a slowdown in inflation. And those four occasions where we had contractions in the past, we had recessions, or in 1929, 1933, of course, the money supply contracted by about 38%.

 

And we had what? We had the Great Depression. Capital cause of my name is Danny. Today’s guest is Steve Hanke.

 

Super excited to have Steve Hanke on. He’s a professor at John Hopkins University for Applied Economics. Steve, thank you so much for coming on, my friend.

 

Yeah, great to be with you, Danny. Yeah, likewise. Let’s just dive right in here, Steve.

 

For people who may be coming across you for the first time, I know how wild that might sound, but I like to give my first time guests a chance to really briefly introduce themselves, their origin story, what got them into investing, economics, finance, macro, all that jazz. So if you don’t mind just taking the floor and just spelling out your origin story. Well, trading actually goes way back, probably at least 70 years.

 

My grandfather, I grew up in Iowa, and my grandfather had a large egg processing operation where you collect eggs, candle eggs, great eggs, put them in storage and eventually ship them back either to New York or Boston. And in the period of time where you were collecting the eggs and sorting them, grading them and so forth, storing them, of course, there was price risk involved. The price of eggs could go up and down.

 

And if you didn’t want to take the risk, in those days, there was a contract on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange for eggs, a futures contract. So if you didn’t want to take the price risk and you were worried about it, you could sell, you could hedge the eggs you had in storage by selling futures contracts forward. So my grandfather was doing that and had me, as they say, Danny, I was his assistant.

 

I was 10 years old then. And so it’s actually a little over 70 years now. So that’s how it started.

 

That’s a pretty senior title for a 10-year-old. Well, grandfathers, they’re inclined to do things like that. So at any rate, I did learn very quickly how that business ran, the basics of it and what hedging was all about and what price risk was all about.

 

And then a few years later, when I was, I think, 14, I did open my first trading account and started trading mainly soybeans. And then there was kind of a gap, went to the university and did my undergraduate work at University of Colorado, as well as the graduate work. And then got very involved with the markets again in 1985.

 

And so that was a big switch. I retained my position at Johns Hopkins as a professor, but I became the chief economist at the Friedberg Mercantile Group in Toronto. And actually, I’m chairman emeritus of the Friedberg Mercantile Group now in Toronto.

 

And that was interesting because it’s primarily, we were trading commodities and foreign exchange and then eventually everything under the sun, equities, all the rest of it. But my initial big trade at Friedberg was actually in 1985, 86. I was first one to predict that OPEC was going to collapse and that the price of oil would go down below $10 a barrel, which it did.

 

And we were short every possible way. The gas oil contract in London, we actually had about 70% of all short interest in that contract in London. And we were short the Saudi Rial and the Kuwaiti Dinar, the two key commodity, or shall we say, oil-related currencies.

 

So that was a big deal. And then subsequently, there were all kinds of other interesting trades. And in 1995, actually 10 years after I began my work at Friedberg’s, I was president of Toronto Trust Argentina in Buenos Aires.

 

And that was the best performing fund in the world in 1995. And I still keep my hand in things. So that’s a summary on the trading side.

 

I obviously wore an academic hat too, and an advisory hat. I’ve advised many heads of state and I’ve done a number of big, designed and implemented a number of big currency reforms. Maybe the most interesting one was in Bulgaria in 1997.

 

Getting dates mixed up here. In 1997, Bulgaria was hyper-inflating. The inflation rate was 242% per month, not per year.

 

And I was invited to come in and be the president’s chief economic advisor, actually chief advisor. And I designed what they call a currency board system, which I’d done in Estonia and Lithuania before that. And that is a system in which we would issue, in this case, the Bulgarian Lev, the domestic currency.

 

It was back 100% with Deutsche Mark reserves, and it traded at a fixed exchange rate with the Deutsche Mark. That was a new currency board system we put in in July of 1997. And we smashed the hyperinflation almost immediately.

 

And within a year, the money market rates were down at 2%. And the foreign exchange reserves, we accumulated, we doubled the size of the foreign reserves that we had at the currency board. So it worked like a charm.

 

It’s still in place in Bulgaria. Wow. Fantastic.

 

So I would say the three things are, there’s an academic side to things, there’s a trading side to things, and then there’s an economic policy side to things. Domestically, of course, the most interesting thing, I was with Reagan in the White House on his Council of Economic Advisors, and I was the one responsible for his privatization initiatives to sell surplus assets, to shrink the balance sheet of the federal government by selling off surplus assets and using their revenues to reduce government debt. So that’s pretty much a quick thumbnail sketch, Danny.

 

That’s it. That’s all there is. I’m just playing here, Steve.

 

Fantastic career. You’ve obviously led a storied career for the last several decades here, Steve. So we’re super thrilled to have you on and get your analysis on the current market trends ongoing in the world.

 

I’d like to get your view on what you see as most topical right now when it comes to the economy, the market, or the world in general. What is on your radar screen at the moment? Well, I think the big thing now is the way central bankers and market participants view things. They view it through a very short-term kind of lens.

 

They call it data dependency. They basically have their finger in the wind. They have no theory of anything.

 

They just have their finger in the wind. They’re looking at all the data as it comes in, hour by hour, day by day, and week by week, that kind of thing. And as a result of that, they don’t have a very good idea of where things are going.

 

They’re not even really looking in the rear view. If anything, they’re looking in the rear view mirror, basically just what’s in front of their eyes at any minute. But to look at the markets, you do have to have a theory, a theory of national income determination.

 

And that is a theory of where nominal GDP is going to go. And nominal GDP is made up of two components. It’s got the real rate of growth in the economy.

 

And then if you add to that the inflation rate in the economy, that is the nominal GDP. So you get real GDP plus inflation, and that gives you nominal. So we’re looking at what normally is called economic growth.

 

That’s the real component. And of course, inflation, which everybody looks at. And right now, the finger in the wind has been, and the data dependency has been that inflation is still with us, and it’s going up.

 

They think it’s going up. And as a result of that, of course, the bond markets, not only in the United States, a 10-year bond, the yield went way up. Gilts in London have gone way up.

 

All the long bonds have gone way up, every place around the world. So if you were long, those long bonds, you would be in for a capital loss, because as the interest rate goes up, the price goes down. My view of that, I think it’s misguided, because I think we not only have ended the year in the United States, that inflation is 2.9% per year, and using the quantity theory of money, which is the theory of national income determination that I use, the quantity theory of money, that’s what drives, the money supply drives nominal GDP, meaning real growth, and more importantly, the inflation component of that.

 

It’s driven by changes in the money supply. So what’s happened with the money supply? Since July of 2022, the money supply has actually contracted. The stock of money measured by M2 in the economy is less today than it was in the summer of 2022.

 

So what’s that imply? Well, that’s only happened four times since the Federal Reserve was founded in 1913. And all four of those times, we had, of course, a recession, things slowed down, the money supply contracts, and then with a lag, usually a lag of around 12 to 24 months, you get a slowdown in the economy, a slowdown in inflation. And those four occasions where we had contractions in the past, we had recessions, or in 1929, 1933, of course, the money supply contracted by about 38%.

 

And we had what? We had the Great Depression, but we didn’t have a recession, we had a Great Depression. So the idea is that the fuel for changes in nominal GDP, it’s the money supply. So the fuel is contracted.

 

And that’s why the inflation rate has fallen. It peaked out using, by the way, the quantity theory of money. John Greenwood and I predicted that the inflation would peak out in the United States at 9%.

 

Well, it peaked out at 9.1. So we got that right. And now using, again, the same theory, the quantity theory of money, the money supply contracts, we anticipated long ago that at the end of last year, December, the inflation rate would be between 2.5% and 3%. Well, it ended at 2.9%. So we got that right.

 

So where is it going now? Now we’re getting into, you said, what’s concerning me or what am I looking at? The big mismatch is that the markets think inflation is going to pick up because Trump’s coming in, he’s supposedly going to put tariffs in, he’s going to cut taxes, he’s going to deregulate the economy. They think this is inflationary, which it is not. Inflation is always and everywhere caused by changes in the money supply, not changes in tariffs, tax rates, deregulation, all these other things.

 

All the other things can change relative price changes moving around. But the big aggregate CPI, for example, or producer price index, those indices in aggregate include lots of different prices. Some of them go up, some of them go down, but the index either goes up or it goes down.

 

And it’s going down, it will keep going down. I think we’ll see some numbers next year, 2% or below 2% for headline CPI. Now, what’s that mean? That means that the yield on bonds will go down because the yield on bonds follows the inflation rate.

 

If the inflation is going down, the yield on bonds goes down, not up. It’s been going up because the expectation in the market is that everyone thinks, based on no theory at all, by the way, based on this data dependency finger in the wind kind of thing, they think inflation is going up. And if they think inflation is going up, of course, that means that bond yields end up going up and the price of the bonds go down.

 

Now, that changed a little bit because the inflation data we got for December, we received that yesterday. And that data, although the inflation rate headline CPI, it ticked up slightly. It went from 2.8 to 2.9 year over year.

 

But if you looked at it in some detail, there was a lot of softness in there. The headline number ticked up, but if you looked under the hood, it looked like inflation was actually most of the components were coming down. One reason gasoline prices went up quite a bit, that pushed the aggregate up a little bit.

 

But as a result of that, what happened yesterday? Well, the stock market had a huge rally and the bonds had a huge rally, meaning that the price didn’t go up, the price went down. And I should say that the price went not down, it went up. The price went up yesterday, not down.

 

And the yields on the 10-year came down more than they’ve come down for quite some time. And I think they’ll be headed down. So if you’ve been reading the paper lately, the last week or so, the headline is the world’s bond markets are in trouble.

 

Prices are going down, yields are going up. But all of that changed even yesterday, you see with the finger in the wind. It didn’t change for me because I think inflation is going down and that’ll be good for bond prices.

 

Prices will go up and the yields will go down following the downward drift and inflation. So that’s one big thing. So what’s causing this contraction of M2 money supply? Is it people pulling their money out of their bank accounts and buying treasury bills? Are treasury bills counted in the M2 money supply? No, it’s because of a couple of things.

 

One is that right now, we’ve had this contraction. And what’s happened to the money supply as we look at it year over year, not going all the way back to July of 2022, just look year over year, the money supply is growing at about 3.25% measured by M2. That’s the broadest measure of money that the Fed records and reports.

 

And if we were growing the money supply fast enough to hit the inflation target that the Fed has of 2%, Hankey’s golden growth rate, using the quantity theory of money again to calculate these numbers, would be about 6%. So not only the stock is contracted, but even though the rate of growth is coming up a little bit gradually, it’s still almost half of what it should be if we wanted to hit on a sustained basis, the 2% inflation target of the Fed. So that’s a little bit of context to your question.

 

Now, the question is, well, what’s in the money supply? Well, the money supply, the biggest thing in the money supply are loans made by commercial banks. That accounts for most of the action in the money supply. The other little component, not the elephant in the room, the little component is what the Fed is doing itself.

 

So you have two things. You’ve got the central bank and the commercial banks. The commercial banks actually produce most of the money.

 

And how do they do that? Well, if they loan you money, Danny, what happens? You credit your checking account, and checking accounts are liquid deposits. And about 75% of all the money supply M2 is made up of liquid deposits of banks. And when you pay off your loan, of course, that destroys money.

 

So you’ve got different things. What’s going on in these checking accounts is very important. Also, what goes on at the Fed, the central bank is important.

 

And what the Fed has been doing, they’ve been engaged in what they call quantitative tightening. They’ve been letting the bonds that they have on their balance sheet run off, mature, and not replacing them. So the Fed’s balance sheet is shrinking.

 

And that shrinkage is shrinking the money supply, slowing down the money supply. So quantitative tightening is one aspect. And they’ve also started increasing the federal funds interest rates.

 

And that indirectly affects things because it affects what the banks are doing with loans. So thinking of the money supply, always thinking one component is currency. That’s produced by the Fed, obviously.

 

But the big component are these liquid deposits at commercial banks. You’ve also got small retail money market funds. They don’t account for too much, but they’re in there.

 

And so that’s what’s going on. And right now, by the way, we’re again, the engine is kind of running on fumes. For burglars, intruders, etc.

 

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All right, guys, let’s get back to the video. How much of a role does money velocity play in inflation, i.e. the turnover rate of money? Theoretically, if the Fed prints out, I don’t know, a trillion dollars, but just sticks it underneath the mattress, that wouldn’t cause inflation now, would it? Well, it turns out that the velocity is kind of a big bugaboo. Most people don’t understand that the trend rate of growth and the velocity is pretty constant.

 

And the trend rate is a little under 2% per year, negative. So by the way, and if you flip velocity and do the reciprocal of that, that’s the demand for money. This reciprocal of velocity is the demand for money.

 

And so that grows at about 2% per year. The velocity itself goes down by 2% per year. And there are deviations, by the way, from that trend, but the deviations tend to revert back to the trend again.

 

That’s why the trend is pretty stable. And so if you look at developed countries, most of them, the velocity is, the trend is about minus 2% per year, reciprocal plus 2% per year. For developing countries, it’s a little higher.

 

It’s about 3% for most of them. And now why is that? Well, the demand for money is greater in developing countries than it is in developed because you’re expanding, for example, financial services, banking systems, those are expanding the reach of banks and finances, expanding in developing countries. So the demand for money is a little bit higher than it is in developed countries.

 

So that’s the story in a nutshell on velocity. I see. So you’ve drawn this parallel with this decreasing money supply that we could see, looking back in time, you’ve had prior recessions come out of decreasing money supply, even the Great Depression.

 

How much danger are we in from seeing another depression-esque environment? And as we all know, in the Great Depression, we did see things like bank failures. Are we close to seeing bank failures in the United States or Europe or anywhere else? Well, first of all, what I anticipate, John Greenwood and I have anticipated this for some time, and we’ve been wrong, by the way. We thought the slowdown would occur by now because the money goes through a transmission mechanism, it changes, and then with a long and variable lag, it ends up working itself into the economy and changing the rate of growth in the economy and changing the inflation in the economy.

 

And that’s what’s tricky about it, because everyone who’s data dependent, they’re watching what the data are today. And what’s causing the data to move around today is what happened to the money supply a year, two years, maybe even three years ago, which, of course, they’re not keeping their eye on the causal factor of the thing in the first place because they have no theory of nominal income determination. My theory is a quantity theory of money that’s been around since certainly the 16th century, and most economists, by the way, were using this all the time.

 

I mean, and it’s only been, shall we say, put in the trash can over the last 30 years, roughly, with what they call post-Keynesian economics. That’s when it went out, because the post-Keynesian models themselves have no aggregate monetary measure in them. The closest thing they would have is maybe some interest rate measure, but monetary policy is not about interest rates, it’s about changes in the money supply.

 

So you got to look at what was happening in the money supply a long time ago, and what was happening. It’s been contracting, and I anticipate that we will see a slowdown this year in the real economy, and we’ll continue to see this drifting down in the consumer price index, both of those things. The consumer price index, as I indicated, using the quantity theory of money, Greenwood and I have hit the nail on the head with that, exactly, ever since the pandemic started, and that’s when the huge increase in the money supply started with the pandemic in 2020, February of 2020.

 

The money supply shot up, and then following that, inflation shot up. Then the money supply comes down, and following that downward trajectory in the money supply, the inflation started coming down, and we’ve hit the inflation thing, and we hit the increase, not only in inflation, but economic activity and asset prices, because once you goose the economy, with a lag of about three to nine months, asset prices go up. So you remember what happened after February of 2020 with the pandemic, the money supply is goosed, and then right away, what happens? The stock market goes up, real estate prices go up, land prices go up, all asset prices, they went up, and that, by the way, something that’s very interesting, because the billionaires made out like bandits.

 

I mean, who owns most of the assets? Rich people do, and rich people got very rich, because I did a calculation, and the billionaires in the United States, prior to the pandemic, and the increase in the money supply, and the increase followed by increase in asset prices, they accounted for 14.2% of GDP, their wealth equal 14.2% of GDP. Now what is it? Now it’s 21.2% of GDP. So this money coming in is not neutral, because it comes in, and it affects asset prices big time.

 

And who owns the assets? Well, rich people own the assets. So the little guy, what happened to him, by the way, with the inflation? The little guy owned no assets, he probably was in debt, a net debtor, going paycheck to paycheck, and his real income, income adjusted for inflation, was actually going down. The billionaire’s wealth was going up.

 

The little guy adjusted for inflation, his income was actually going down. And so as a result, I think this was a main factor in the election of Trump, because the little guy, they don’t know exactly, they’re not doing calculations like I am, the arithmetic, but they sense that the big guys are making out like bandits, and they’re struggling. And that leads to a lot of resentment and the demand for change.

 

So throw the Democrats out. This was all caused on the Democratic, the Biden watch. Yes.

 

So they don’t get into the details of it, but they have some fairly good sense, that number one, they know they’re struggling. And they read the newspaper and they see that the big guys, they’re seem to be doing pretty well. What do you expect from Trump’s second term? How do you think he responds to the slowdown that you’re forecasting? Well, it’s a little hard to say with much precision.

 

The one thing we do know about Trump and this is good, that they want to lock in these tax reductions that actually were instituted temporarily and kept during the Biden years that Trump put in in the first place. They’re trying to make those permanent. That’s a good thing.

 

That’s just good old fashioned supply side economics, Reaganomics, whatever you want to call it. That part’s good. The other thing that he has in his mind that is pretty clear is that he’s a mercantilist.

 

He’s never seen a protectionist measure that he didn’t like. So we can anticipate there are going to be some increases in tariffs and protectionist measures, which are bad, but we don’t know exactly what they’re going to be. Are tariffs inflationary? I mean, after you just said, yeah, go ahead.

 

No, they’re not. They act as a sales tax on imported goods that come into the United States and the burden of that sales tax, some of it depends on the particular goods that are coming in the industries, but the middlemen, the people who buy them and then sell them, they will take part of that burden of the sales tax and they’ll pass some of it on to the consumer. So the consumer is going to get hit with something and the middlemen will get hit with something and to the extent that those imports don’t go to final consumers, but go to as inputs to manufacturing, those will increase the cost of those inputs and those manufacturing processes that they go into, but they won’t change overall inflation.

 

They will only change the relative price of those imports. The relative price of those imports compared to everything else will go up, but the overall inflation rate won’t change because the overall inflation rate is determined by the quantity of money. Is the hollowing out of the middle class, like you’ve sort of alluded to, is that inevitable or can it be reversed? Well, it certainly happened with this huge increase in the money supply that we’ve had because the way that the channels that the increase in the money supply have gone through, this time around anyway, have not been neutral.

 

They’ve been tremendously beneficial for very rich people who owned a lot of assets before the injection of money into the system and before that injection caused asset prices to go up. So the best kind of monetary policy is one that’s designed to be with the intention of being neutral, not changing things. So that’s one aspect of this hollowing out, but there are lots of other components to it because you’ve got the fiscal policy, that means government spending, that can affect the middle class, and taxes also can affect the middle class.

 

So the fiscal policy has two parts to it. One is taxing, that’s the revenue coming in, and depending on how you’re designing the tax code, it affects different groups of low, middle, high income. The most neutral thing and simple thing would just be a flat tax of 15% on everybody’s income, no matter what your income category happened to be.

 

That would be something that would be kind of, shall we say, a neutral tax. So if you had a neutral monetary policy that didn’t distort and change in income distributions, shall we say, or people’s income affected in different ways and different classes of people, that would be one thing and taxes with fiscal policy is another thing. What do you think of this notion that Trump’s kind of teased leading up to his election of ending the income tax as well as the IRS and substituting that revenue contribution to something called the ERS, the External Revenue Service, which would be responsible for- I think it would be a disaster.

 

This is the tariff thing. Number one, you’d have to go through hypothetical scenarios, but you wouldn’t be able to generate enough income with tariffs to replace the income tax anyway. But the whole idea of tariffs is bad because tariffs are- most people, a lot of business people and protectionist mercantilists, they think that trade is actually a zero-sum game, that if you gain by trading with me, I lose exactly the amount that you gain.

 

That’s a zero-sum game. Now, let’s take a hypothetical thing. Danny’s selling Hankey something and we agree to the terms of the contract and the price.

 

Now, that’s a positive-sum game if we both agree. Danny, the seller, agrees to sell because it’s beneficial. Hankey agrees to buy because it’s beneficial.

 

So Danny and Hankey gain. That’s what international trade is all about. It’s not zero-sum, it’s positive-sum.

 

And these high tariffs, by the way, if they actually would go in, would slow down the real rate of growth, the potential rate of growth in the U.S. economy. The potential growth rate in the economy now in the U.S., it’s a little over 2%. It’s around 2.2% depending on whose calculations you use.

 

Let’s just say it’s a little over 2%. That’s a sustainable, long-run potential growth in the economy. And if you lard it up with a bunch of tariffs, that thing is going to tick down a little bit.

 

Maybe it won’t be 2.2%, maybe it’ll be 2.1%. But that makes a big difference over a 10 or 20-year horizon. That small tick down, it makes a huge difference. Yeah.

 

So geopolitically, the world’s at a very tenuous state. Things are very unpredictable. Oil is shooting through the roof right now.

 

It started with $80 just yesterday, but it seems to have retreated back a bit. We don’t know where things are going. In the event that we do see an energy spike because of some unforeseen conflict, what does that portend to your current forecast of the economy? Well, you’re saying, well, what if the I think the more likely scenario is that the oil prices are going to remain under pressure because right now OPEC has a lot of excess capacity.

 

And I don’t think they’re going to be increasing going forward because the demand is being, the increment in demand, the extra demand that’s coming into the market for crude is basically being supplied by new non-OPEC production. So OPEC is kind of in a corner. They have a lot of excess capacity.

 

All the incremental demand, most of it is being actually accommodated by new non-OPEC production. So the picture looks, in that picture, my bias would be towards lower, not higher, oil prices. That’s kind of the fundamentals.

 

Now you’re throwing a spanner in the works, Danny. You’re saying, well, what if there’s some huge geopolitical thing and the price goes to $100 a barrel? Well, I mean, obviously, if it went to $100 a barrel, then we know that the price of oil is going to go up relative to other things. But that doesn’t necessarily mean inflation, by the way.

 

And let me give you an example of how this works. And this gets back to all of our conversation about the money supply and relative price movements versus changes in the price level. In the 70s, as you know, we had two oil crises.

 

We had one in 73 and one in 79. And this was international. Remember, it was OPEC.

 

So with the first crisis in Japan, like most other countries, the Bank of Japan said, well, the price of oil is going up. We’re going to accommodate the price of oil going up in relative terms by increasing the money supply. So the Bank of Japan did increase the money supply.

 

And sure enough, they got more inflation. In 79, they said, well, we’re not going to do this. The price of oil is going up, but we’re not going to change the rate of growth in the money supply very much.

 

And what happened? Nothing. They didn’t get inflation with the second time around. The only thing that happened the second time around was, yeah, the price of oil went up relative to everything else.

 

But the overall level of inflation in Japan didn’t change much because the Bank of Japan never changed the money supply very much. So that’s a perfect example to illustrate the mechanics of what would go on. If we had a big spike in the price of oil, if you don’t accommodate it with a big increase in the money supply, you’re not going to get much of a change in inflation.

 

And Japan in the 70s is a perfect case study of that. Does gold trace inflation? Is gold a harbinger for inflation? And what do you forecast for the precious metals for 2025? I think gold will continue in its bull market in the coming year. And the main driver by that, you do have momentum.

 

It is in a bull market, but it’s being fed at the base by central bank buying. I see. And does this include silver? Silver, I don’t have any comment on it because I don’t follow it very closely.

 

So I better not say much about it. Gotcha. Well, it’s been a fascinating interview here, Steve.

 

Anything else you want to cover that we didn’t get to before we wrap up? I don’t have anything in particular. I would just like to say that about two months ago, Palgrave Macmillan published my most recent book. It’s called Capital Interest and Waiting.

 

I think I sent you a link, a Springer link, if people want to see what’s in the book, Table of Conducts, and even buy it, they can look at that link. The other thing, if they want to follow me, they can really get me in real time and keep their finger in the wind by going to x, my handle is at Steve underscore Hankey, H-A-N-K-E. Fantastic.

 

We’ll have the links to both of those down below. So be sure to check them out, guys. You got value out of this content.

 

Be sure to give us a like and comment. Go, Steve, go in the comment section. If you disagreed with anything, however, do let me know.

 

I do read the comments. So very interested to get your takes here, guys. Also, check us out on Substack, capitalcosm.substack.com to see all these interviews before the YouTube audience does, and ad free and uncensored if it ever warrants it.

 

Subscribe to this channel so you don’t miss an episode as well. And with all that said, Steve, thank you so much for coming on, my friend. It’s been a pleasure.

 

And Guy, thank you so much for watching, and I’ll catch you in the next episode. Bye, y’all. See you, Danny.

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